Protests in Abdanan, following the deaths of thirteen workers in a bus accident, have taken on a political dimension. It is too soon to call them the beginning of a new nationwide movement. They nevertheless bring a central question into focus: under what conditions can social unrest change Iran’s distribution of power?

The fall of a government does not necessarily transform the political order. That depends in part on who controls the institutions, armed forces and security apparatuses that ensure continuity.

The institutional question

In Book III of Politics, Aristotle classifies regimes according to whether authority rests with one person, a few, or the many. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx shows how governments can fall while the state apparatus—its army, police and bureaucracy—survives and grows stronger. In 1917, Lenin likewise placed control of state power at the center of revolutionary strategy.

These arguments illuminate the Iranian case. Economic crisis, protest and even war do not automatically produce political transformation. Their consequences depend on how they affect the institutions that hold and protect power.

In the Islamic Republic, that question leads directly to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Guards are no longer merely an instrument for defending the regime; they have become one of its principal centers of power. A transition that ignored this reality could replace the leaders while leaving the structures that enabled them to govern intact.

What happens to the Revolutionary Guards?

The IRGC is central to the regime’s repressive apparatus. It also commands economic resources and networks of influence. Through the Quds Force, it plays a role in external operations and in supporting armed groups.

The fall of the regime would not, by itself, eliminate the Guards’ power. If they retained their weapons, chain of command and networks, they could obstruct a transition or help reconstruct authoritarian rule under a different name.

A genuine political break would require ending the IRGC’s autonomous political role, dismantling structures of domestic repression and armed intervention abroad, and placing military and security forces under the authority of lawful, accountable institutions.

The challenge would be to achieve that without disabling the state or allowing the security apparatus to preserve its interests by reorganizing around a new government.

Historical revolutions show why popular mobilization alone may not be enough. In Russia in February 1917, soldiers’ defection to the protesters hastened the tsar’s fall. In Romania in 1989, the army’s withdrawal of support accelerated the collapse of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s rule. In Iran in 1979, the military’s declaration of neutrality on February 11 marked the end of the monarchy. In The History of the Russian Revolution, Leon Trotsky examined the role of such breaks within the armed forces. In each case, the conduct of institutions charged with defending the existing order helped shape the political outcome.

These precedents cannot simply be transferred to present-day Iran. They do, however, underline the contest over institutional control that stands between protest and a change of regime.

Can war produce a political transition?

The joint Israeli-American strikes of February 28, 2026, killed Ali Khamenei and several senior military and political officials. Yet the Islamic Republic did not collapse: Mojtaba Khamenei succeeded his father, and the system maintained continuity. The killing of leaders and destruction of command centers did not, on their own, dismantle the machinery of power.

The Guards are not necessarily a unified bloc, nor do they control every institution. But their growing influence makes it untenable to treat them as a subordinate instrument of the state’s leadership. Debates over reforming the Intelligence Ministry reflect a wider struggle over the security chain of command; by themselves, however, they do not establish that the IRGC is taking control of the ministry.

If a renewed military campaign were intended to end the regime, its effectiveness could not be measured only by the number of facilities destroyed or officials killed. Its impact on the Guards’ cohesion, resources and ability to control society would matter as well. If those structures remained in place, military defeat could change the form of power without ending authoritarian rule.

Foreign intervention cannot, by itself, build a replacement political order. A transition requires organized social and political forces, institutions capable of assuming responsibility, and a new authority with legitimacy of its own.

The decisive question, then, is not only whether the Islamic Republic can fall. It is who would exercise power afterward, and through which institutions. No serious assessment of Iran’s transition can sidestep the future of the Revolutionary Guards: the challenge is to end their autonomous political power and prevent it from reconstituting itself in another form.